tion. In this paper, I want to defend and refi ne a contextualist approach to knowledge and scepticism. After a brief exposition of the sceptical problem, I will sketch the standard contextualist approach to it as expressed (with signifi cant variations), for instance, in the work of David Lewis, Steward Cohen, and Keith DeRose, and argue that this approach is unconvincing, among other reasons because it is too hospitable to the sceptic (1). Looking at knowledge-attributions in real-life cases will motivate a contextualist approach enriched by a "default and challenge" conception of justifi cation (2), as has been proposed before by, among others, Michael Williams. Although I sympathise with much of Williams' account, I will argue that his conception of a "default justifi cational status" is insuffi ciently complex, and that, for this reason, his version of contextualism is also overly hospitable to the sceptic (3). Next, I will sketch some features of a suffi ciently complex contextualist-cum-default and challenge conception of knowledge. Perhaps the most remarkable feature of the contextualism defended here, as compared to other versions of contextualism, is that it does not imply that the same knowledge-claim can be true in one context but false in another. Th is in turn is a consequence of construing contextualism about knowledge not as a linguistic thesis about the usage of the expression "to know" and its cognates, but rather as a claim about the diff erent standards at work in diff erent epistemic practices. As I will argue, if a knowledge-claim can be evaluated by the standards of diff erent practices, it is always the "strictest" practice that counts (4). Despite incorporating some features of "absolutist" conceptions of knowledge, however, the "epistemic practice" contextualism defended here can deal with the sceptical challenge in a satisfactory way (5).
I.
I leave my apartment. In the staircase, I stop and ask myself whether I locked the door. Did I? Do I know that I did? In order to know that I did, I must be able to rule out that I forgot to lock the door, which on refl ection I can't. So I don't know that I locked the door. -Now I turn back to check whether I locked the door. I press the handle and fi nd the door is locked. Do I now know that the door is locked? Th e intuitive answer clearly is: yes, now I know the door is locked.
But many epistemologists would hesitate. After all, there are many possible situations compatible with my fi nding the door locked (more
